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Abstract
This paper analyzes how the Chinese media told their international audiences about 
their country and the United States under the pandemic. The outbreak of COVID-19 
became a pivotal moment in terms of Chinese public diplomacy. Since the 21st century, the 
Chinese Communist Party embraced soft power and strengthened its effort on state pro-
paganda. The outbreak of COVID-19, however, affected the Chinese global reputation 
because of the delay in dealing with the pandemic. Therefore, the Chinese government had 
to confront the global reputation problem, and the necessity of public diplomacy was aug-
mented dramatically. This study aims at estimating the change of public diplomacy after 
the pandemic using three different classification and scaling techniques about topics, geo-
graphical information, and the sentiment polarity. This study estimates the change in tones 
about China and the U.S. on English versions of the Chinese newspapers: China Daily and 
Global Times. The statistical analysis elucidates the Chinese media’s struggle in telling 
China’s stories well and the little change of negative campaign against the United States. 
The Chinese state media outlets could not ignore the fact that the Chinese government 
faced difficulties under the pandemic and had to make arguments based on this fact. On 
the other hand, the further inflation of negative campaign on the United States is observed 
only in the political articles because the negative campaign was conducted even before the 
pandemic. Therefore, while the outbreak of COVID-19 was not the crucial structural break 
in terms of the negative campaign about the United States, the pandemic damaged China’s 
story-telling capacity.
1  Introduction
The outbreak of COVID-19 became a pivotal moment in Chinese public diplomacy. As the cul-
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ture or the information became important in international relations due to globalization, public 
diplomacy was regarded as an essential tool to enhance the country’s image. As Joseph Nye con-
ceptualized soft power, many governments started to pay attention to the image’s role, and the 
Chinese government is not the exception. Since the 21st century, the Chinese Communist Party 
embraced the notion of soft power as well as public diplomacy and strengthened the effort on state 
propaganda. Xi Jinping commented on the importance of the reputation at the 19th National Con-
gress of Chinese Communist Party, saying that China would improve the ”capacity of for engaging 
in international communication so as to tell China’s stories well” (Xi 2017). Therefore, it is fair to say 
that the Chinese government cared much about its reputation even before the pandemic. However, 
the outbreak of the novel coronavirus termed as COVID-19 seriously damaged china’s reputation 
making the task of public diplomacy much more challenging than before. The virus, originated in 
Wuhan, China, rapidly spread across the globe, which resulted in the biggest pandemic (WHO 2020). 
The pandemic affected the Chinese global reputation because of China’s delay in dealing with the 
pandemic (Jacob 2020). Therefore, the Chinese government had to confront the global reputation 
problem, and the necessity of public diplomacy has been augmented. However, the analysis of Chi-
nese public diplomacy after the pandemic is limited, especially in the quantitative research.
This paper analyzes how the Chinese media told the international audiences about their coun-
try and the United States under the pandemic, quantitatively. Using the English-versions of China 
Daily and Global Times from January 1st, 2019 up to October 31st, 2020, this paper elucidates the 
change of tones about China and the United States, respectively. Besides, this paper investigates 
the change in tones in every three topics (Politics, Economy, and Life) by estimating the topics of 
the articles. The analysis of this paper demonstrates the following three conclusions. First of all, it 
demonstrates that even Chinese newspapers struggled in telling China’s stories well. After the pan-
demic, the sentiment about China in all Chinese newspaper outlets decreased dramatically. This 
tendency is common across all the topics. China could not escape from the fact that they faced diffi-
culties, and there is a change in how the Chinese media tell their countries greatness after the 
pandemic. While the media told what China achieved and praised the country before the pandemic, 
the newspapers started to include the articles highlighting the effort to tackle difficulties since the 
pandemic, not ones praising the achieved policies. Secondly, while the Chinese newspapers have 
negatively mentioned the United States, the further acceleration of the negative campaign due to 
the pandemic is observed mostly in political articles. Even in political articles where the negative 
campaign is confirmed, the decline of the sentiment against the U.S. is smaller compared to the sen-
timent about China. Unlike the political articles, the economy articles do not show the tone’s change 
after the pandemic. The China-US economic rivalry was already intensified even before the pan-
demic, and the pandemic did not change the structure of the rivalry. While the life articles show 
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the decline, this reflects not the negative campaign but the decrease in the cultural and educational 
exchange with the United States. Finally, this study argues about the implication and future of Chi-
nese soft power. The life articles show the decline in the sentiment because of the cessation of the 
cultural or educational exchange with the United States. Having said that, the confirmed decline of 
the cultural or educational exchange might affect soft power more than the negative campaign. The 
father of the concept of soft power, Joseph Nye, emphasized the importance of the civilian’s role in 
public diplomacy (Nye 2008). Therefore, the lack of cultural or educational exchange might hurt 
both the United States’ and China’s soft power, which could be the future potential source to deteri-
orate the China-US rivalry.
This paper proceeds as follows. Firstly, the author identifies the newspaper’s role in Chinese 
public diplomacy and its relation with COVID-19 through the literature review. Secondly, based on 
the literature review, the author constructs the hypotheses and make the research design. This 
paper mainly asks two questions: (1) How has the Chinese story-telling in general about China and 
the United States changed after the outbreak of COVID-19?; and (2) How has the Chinese story-tell-
ing about China and the United States in all three topics (Economy, Politics, and Life) changed after 
the outbreak of COVID-19? Finally, the author shows the results and mentions their implications in 
the discussion.
2  Literature Review
Along with globalization and the development of information techniques, the role of information 
and culture has increased recently; in this context, public diplomacy has attracted many countries’ 
attention as a way to strengthen their image. It is not until the 21st century that information and 
culture have been regarded as a vital power source, often called ”soft power.” Nye (2004) conceptu-
alized soft power as the power that ”rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others” (p.5). 
To put it simply, different from hard power like military power, it achieves the objectives by attrac-
tion and co-option rather than coercion or payments. In this context, several approaches to enhance 
soft power have been devised; public diplomacy is one. The concept of public diplomacy was 
devised under the cold war, and the traditional idea of public diplomacy focused on the state effort 
(Cull 2008). Along with globalization and the prevalence of soft power, however, the concept of pub-
lic diplomacy was formalized again as a way to enhance the country’s image. Nye (2008) argued 
that public diplomacy is ”an instrument that governments use to mobilize these resources to com-
municate with and attract the publics of other countries, rather than merely their governments” 
(p.95). Public diplomacy encompasses many activities, such as the advertisement of the culture 
through broadcasting or promoting the cultural exchange. Therefore, once the notion of soft power 
─　　─7
Telling China’s Stories Well?
was embraced globally, public diplomacy attracted the attention for strengthening soft power.
In the 21st century, the Chinese government has begun to engage in public diplomacy in its 
own way. With its rapid rise in the global community’s presence, the discussion over soft power 
emerged inside China. Zhang (2019) pointed out that the foundation to embrace public diplomacy 
was formed from 2000 to 2007 because of economic development, the decline in the sense of xeno-
phobia, and the problem awareness about the China threat theory. Because the Chinese government 
regarded the China threat theory as a major problem, public diplomacy became a necessary tool to 
change other countries’ recognition. As a result, during the reign of Hu Jintao, the Chinese embrace 
of soft power was observed for the first time. Shambaugh (2020) mentioned that the concept of soft 
power was first officially mentioned in Hu’s speech to the 17th Party Congress in 2007. Also, peace-
ful rise, the concept most forcefully used by Zheng Bijian, was proposed in that context. Shambaugh 
(2013) argued that this concept was to confront the China threat theory, saying that China’s rise 
was benign. However, their understanding of soft power differs from Nye’s one in that the Chinese 
government prioritizes the governmental role. Shambaugh (2020) argued that the Chinese Commu-
nist Party interpreted Nye’s soft power with an overemphasis on the state’s role in soft power. 
Indeed, Nye is not supportive of the state propaganda. Rather, Nye (2008) concluded that the state 
propaganda which degenerates its credibility would be counterproductive. Therefore, although pub-
lic diplomacy has been embraced in China, its practice has differed from what Nye thought, with 
the emphasis on the state’s story-telling capacity.
The English versions of the Chinese newspapers are a vital tool for public diplomacy; they 
have been used to strengthen the image. Multiple Chinese media were embarked on the global 
expansion to upgrade the Chinese image. In terms of newspapers, two English versions of the Chi-
nese newspapers are regarded as the primary news media targeting international audiences: China 
Daily and Global Times. Although there are some differences between these two media, it is ratio-
nal to think that both two media outlets have served as the forum of public diplomacy. As for china 
Daily, its presence in public diplomacy is significant. According to Lin and Bergin (2018), China 
Daily circulated newspaper-like advertisements called ’China Watch’ in more than 30 newspapers 
worldwide, such as the New York Times in the United States or Mainichi Shimbun in Japan. On the 
other hand, Global Times, a spin-off of the People’s Daily, differs from China Daily in its indepen-
dence; however, it still shows evidence of the linkage with the propaganda system. In line with 
Shambaugh (2013), though Global Times demonstrates much more independence in the articles’ con-
tents, even indirectly, there is a linkage between Global Times and the Chinese official propaganda 
system, which was proved based on his interview with the senior editor. Therefore, although the 
level of linkage differs between China Daily and Global Times, both have been used in public diplo-
macy to repair and upgrade China’s international image.
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Along with the development of public diplomacy in China, the tone of telling China’s stories 
well has changed over time, but Chinese public diplomacy shares the characteristics: either the 
explanation of China or the denunciation of other countries. Aoyama (2014) categorized Chinese 
public diplomacy’s characteristics into three types: Passive, Active, and Aggressive public diplo-
macy. Passive public diplomacy was devised to refute the China threat theory. It is passive because 
China explains itself by saying what China is not (like China is not a threat). The concept of peace-
ful rise could be categorized in this type of public diplomacy. However, since the latter half of the 
2000s, the style of public diplomacy evolved from passive style into more active and aggressive 
ones, each corresponds to the second and the third category of public diplomacy (Zhang 2019). The 
second category, Active public diplomacy, is the same as Passive public diplomacy in that the aim 
is to explain China. It is active in that China explains itself by saying what China is. Many slogans 
under Xi Jinping, such as ”Chinese Dream” or ”the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” could 
be categorized into this category. Different from ”peaceful rise” that corresponds to China threat 
theory, these slogans talk about China not from the existing western framework but from China’s 
own framework. Finally, Aggressive public diplomacy means a negative campaign against other 
countries to protect Chinese foreign interests. A notable example is the one against Japan under 
the Senkaku-Diaoyu islands dispute. According to the situation, all three tones, Passive, Active, and 
Aggressive public diplomacy, have been used by the Chinese Communist Party.
The outbreak of COVID-19 became the pivotal moment in Chinese public diplomacy; while the 
case studies showed the Chinese propaganda campaign over the COVID-19 issues, it has not been 
elucidated how the Chinese public diplomacy itself has transformed under COVID-19. The outbreak 
of COVID-19 deteriorated the global reputation against China. Because the origin of the pandemic 
was in China, the Chinese government suffered severe damage to its reputation, especially from the 
United States. A notable example is the remarks by U.S. officials. The U.S. Secretary of State Mike 
Pompeo called COVID-19 as ”wuhan virus” (Politico 2020). These remarks could highly defame the 
Chinese government because they highlight the origin of the virus, implying the responsibilities of 
the pandemic. Therefore, COVID-19 deteriorated China’s image, and China had to confront the big-
gest defiance ever in public diplomacy. As a result, in order to maintain the international image, the 
Chinese government launched a massive propaganda campaign about COVID-19. Though the num-
ber of articles investigating Chinese media and COVID-19 is limited currently, Jacob (2020) 
summarized several external propaganda campaigns under the pandemic: highlighting the struggle 
of other countries, the increased effort to advertise China’s contribution, and referring COVID-19 as 
a global problem which requires the international cooperation. The unique one under the pandemic 
is the China Daily’s website: Fighting COVID-19: The Chinese Way. This website elucidates the 
information about COVID-19 and highlights the Chinese effort to fight against COVID-19. However, 
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the scope of previous work fall beyond the argument of Chinese public diplomacy itself; they could 
talk about the type of public diplomacy directly related to COVID-19, but their insight and observa-
tions are not sufficient to judge how COVID-19 has changed Chinese public diplomacy. After the 
summary of the propaganda campaign over COVID-19, Jacob (2020) argued that because the pan-
demic’s outbreak weakened the Chinese Communist Party, China had to resort to public diplomacy 
to retain legitimacy. While his analysis could apply to the campaign over COVID-19, however, this 
argument could not apply to public diplomacy in general due to the limitation of the observations. 
Therefore, whether and how COVID-19 has accelerated Chinese public diplomacy remains unclear.
In conclusion, while the pandemic was a crucial moment for Chinese public diplomacy as China 
started to care about its reputation, the research, especially the quantitative one, about how Chi-
nese public diplomacy changed under the pandemic was limited. Therefore, this study checks any 
change in public diplomacy after the outbreak of a pandemic. Specifically, based on the previous 
research, the author investigates the transformation of tones about China and its major rival, the 
United States, on the English versions of the Chinese newspapers, and elaborates how the Chinese 
story-telling changed under the pandemic.
3  Hypothesis
This paper analyzes how the Chinese media outlets have told their country and the United 
States under the pandemic. More precisely, this paper aims at detecting any changes in public 
diplomacy after the pandemic. The author uses the sentiment about the United States and China to 
estimate the shift of public diplomacy because of public diplomacy categories. As previously noted, 
in line with Aoyama (2014), Chinese public diplomacy could be categorized into three types. Because 
one type, Passive public diplomacy, evolved into Active one in the latter half of the 2000s, the varia-
tion of the current public diplomacy consists of two types: either Active or Aggressive. The 
practice of each type of public diplomacy, at least between either Passive or Active one and 
Aggressive one, could be identifiable because each public diplomacy corresponds to the sentiment 
against either the U.S. or China (see Table 1). Active public diplomacy corresponds to the increase 
Table 1: Type of Public Diplomacy in China (from Aoyama 2014)
Type of Public Diplomacy Contents Expected Change in Sentiment about China
Expected Change in 
Sentiment about the US
Active To tell the attractiveness of China Increase Not change
Aggressive The negative campaign on other government Not change Decrease
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in China’s sentiment because it aims to tell a positive image of China. Then, as for Aggressive pub-
lic diplomacy, it corresponds to the decrease in the U.S. sentiment because it defames the other 
countries to protect the Chinese foreign interests. Therefore, by looking at the sentiment score 
about the U.S. and China, it is possible to roughly estimate changes in public diplomacy.
The research of this paper has two parts, and both are about estimating the change in public 
diplomacy. Firstly, this paper investigates the change in the tones about the United States and 
China in general after the pandemic. It is rational to expect the further empowerment of Active 
and Aggressive public diplomacy after the pandemic because some symptoms of the intensification 
of the rivalry have been observed. For example, since the outbreak of COVID-19, several U.S. jour-
nalists have been expelled from China. Reuter (2020) reported that three wall street journalists 
were expelled from China because the criticism on the Chinese fight against COVID-19 was 
regarded as racism. Therefore, according to the category of public diplomacy and the expected 
change of sentiment, the corresponding hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 1.  The outbreak of COVID-19 increased the sentiment about China in Chinese news-
papers.
Hypothesis 2.  The outbreak of COVID-19 decreased the sentiment about the U.S. in Chinese 
newspapers.
Secondly, this study aims to identify any change in the tones about two countries in the follow-
ing three topics: Life, Politics, and Economy. As for active diplomacy, it is expected that the 
outbreak of COVID-19 increased sentiment about China on all three topics. As previously noted, 
Jacob (2020) concluded that the pandemic deteriorated the Chinese Communist Party’s international 
image, which should force them to resort to public diplomacy to repair the image. Therefore, if 
China conducted a massive propaganda campaign, it is expected that the change of sentiment could 
be observed in all three topics.
Hypothesis 3.  The outbreak of COVID-19 increased the sentiment about China in all topics in 
Chinese news- papers.
On the other hand, as for Aggressive public diplomacy against the United States, it is rational 
to think that the sentiment’s change shall be observed in the life and political aspects. Because of 
the outbreak of COVID-19, the political intensification of the Sino-US rivalry has been observed. 
Indeed, Jacob (2020) mentioned some negative campaigns over COVID-19 related issues. In other 
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words, the Chinese government tried to repair their image by referring to the failure of the 
COVID-19 treatment by other governments. It could contain articles about life; telling the miserable 
life in other countries could relatively elevate China’s image. Therefore, the sentiment against the 
U.S. has been changed in the topic of politics and life. While some media sources have generalized 
this political intensification into the intensification of the rivalry in general, no case studies have 
been given to prove that the pandemic deteriorates the China-US rivalry in the economy. On the 
economic issue, the recent China-US trade war already worsened the two countries’ economic rela-
tionship. Because COVID-19 did not change the economic rivalry structure, it is expected that the 
economic sentiment has not changed much.
Hypothesis 4.  The outbreak of COVID-19 decreased the sentiment about the U.S. in articles 
about politics and life in Chinese newspapers.
4  Research Design
Corresponding to all four hypotheses, the author sets up different research designs, respec-
tively. The first two hypotheses require the estimation of the sentiments in general about China 
and the United States. The procedure consists of the following three steps. Firstly, the author iden-
tifies the country of the sentences using the classification technique and categorizes the sentences 
into the country. For example, if sentence A talks about Donald Trump, it is categorized into the 
United States. Then, the author estimates the sentiment of the sentences in each country group, 
either China or the United States. Lastly, the author constructs the two-way interaction model to 
estimate the existence of the change statistically. As for the latter two hypotheses, in addition to 
the estimation of the country and sentiment score, they require the estimation of the topics. Here, 
the author uses the topic model and categorizes the sentences into three topics: Life, Politics, Econ-
Table 2: Examples of Terms of Dictionary for seeded LDA in each topic
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omy. After estimating the topics, the author uses the three-way interaction model to evaluate the 
change in all three topics.
In the research, the estimations of the country, topics, and the sentiment score are necessary 
methodologically. To estimate the country of the sentences, the author uses the geographical classi-
fication method called newsmap. Newsmap is the semi-supervised machine learning techniques to 
classify articles about countries. Although this method does not involve human involvement, the 
performance of the techniques is considerable. Watanabe (2018) compared the simple keyword 
matching, Open Calais and Geoparser.io (geographical information extraction systems), and news-
map, and concluded that the accuracy of newsmap is comparable to the other methods. However, 
this research suffers from the problem in estimating the country of the corpus. The newspaper 
articles likely talk about more than one country in one article and the estimation of the topic could 
not be done correctly in the article level. Therefore, in this study, the author estimates the country 
of sentences rather than articles. Of course, the sentence-level estimation could raise the possibility 
of misclassification. Therefore, the author conducts the robustness check by estimating the score 
only for the sentences with more than 10, 20, and 30 tokens because the number of tokens means 
the amount of information.
For the estimation of the topics, the author uses the seeded Latent Dirichlet Allocation (Seeded 
LDA). In line with Blei (2011), the Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) is one of the most widely used 
topic models. Seeded LDA is the semi-supervised version of the Latent Dirichlet Allocation (Lu et 
al. 2011). Specifically, Seeded LDA weighs the terms on the dictionary, and LDA finds the words 
that occur with the weighted words. As a result, seeded LDA could create the full dictionary of 
topics from the given dictionary and estimate each corpus’s topic. Examples of the terms on the 
dictionary (both seeded and full dictionary) are in Table 2. The topics of politics and economy are 
easy to understand. Different from politics and economy, the topics of life might be bewildering. 
Life articles are intended to collect all the items about neither the politics nor the economy. This 
topic is labeled as life in that it mostly includes articles about people’s life, such as culture or educa-
tion. Different from the estimation of the country, the estimation of the topics is conducted in the 
article level.
Finally, this study uses Latent Semantic Scaling (LSS) to estimate the sentiment score. Latent 
Semantic Scaling is a low-cost document scaling technique (Watanabe 2020). With the sentiment dic-
tionary, this study uses LSS to estimate the polarity of the sentences. As previously noted, these 
sentiment scores are used for regression as the dependent variable.
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5  Data
As for data, the author collects the English versions of a news article from two famous Chinese 
news sources: China Daily and Global Times. Because of the large number of articles, only the sto-
ries related to the U.S. or China are downloaded with the search terms “Chin*”, “us”, “united”, or 
“america*.” The date range of the stories is from 2019/01/01 to 2020/10/31. After deleting the dupli-
cations, the total number of articles is 17999 articles (China Daily) and 33969 articles (Global Times). 
Both China Daily and Global Times could serve the purpose of the research, and the author could 
check the robustness by using both sources. As discussed in the literature review, both news media 
are the primary English newspaper and relate with the government. Although China Daily is more 
suitable for the purpose, the sentiment score in both sources could be regarded as the effort in pub-
lic diplomacy. Therefore, both sources could be used in the research design. They are useful to 
check the robustness because as long as both sources have the relation with the Chinese govern-
ment, the fluctuation of the sentiment in each media outlet should not differ significantly; and if it 
differs to a great extent, there is a possibility that something goes wrong in terms of procedure.
6  Results
Figure 1 is the sentiment score in the articles about China, and Figure 2 is about the United 
States, respectively. Because the score obtained from China Daily highly correlates with the score 
from Global Times, the results are robust. About China, even though the sentiment fluctuates a lot, 
it is obvious from Figure 1 that the average of the sentiment declines after COVID-19 (the dotted 
red line). On the other hand, however, it is not evident from Figure 2 that the sentiment about the 
U.S. changes after COVID-19.
To statistically evaluate the effect of COVID-19, the author uses the following two-way interac-
tion model. The model is:
0 1 2 1 2i i i i i iSentiment Source Country COVID Country COVIDβ β β γ γ= + + + + *  (1)
where Sourcei is the source dummy (China Daily or Global Times), Countryi is the dummy variable 
of the country (China or the U.S.), COVIDi is the time dummy. The time dummy COVIDi is coded 
as one after December 10, 2019. The timing is based on the survey that COVID-19 might have been 
circulating in Wuhan as early as December 10, 2019 (Allen-Ebrahimian 2020).
The results are summarized in model (1) on Table 3, and the interaction plot is in Figure 3. 
The interaction plot shows the change of the sentiment after the outbreak of COVID-19 by each 
country. The horizontal line represents the country; the left CN means China, and the right US 
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means the United States. The vertical line represents the change of the sentiment after the pan-
demic. As shown in Figure 3, the 95 percent confidence interval does not include zero. Therefore, 
statistically, the decline of the sentiment due to COVID-19 is significant about both China and the 
United States. Therefore, while hypothesis 1 is rejected, hypothesis 2 is supported. However, the 
sentiment about China has decreased more than the sentiment about the U.S. after the outbreak of 
COVID-19.
In order to test hypotheses 3 and 4, the author constructs the three-way interaction model 
(country, topic, and time) as follows.
Figure 2: The sentiment score about the United States (The red line is the outbreak of COVID-19)
Figure 1: The sentiment score about China (The red line is the outbreak of COVID-19)
─　　─15
Telling China’s Stories Well?




( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
i i i i i
i i i i i
i i i i i i
Sentiment Source Country Topic Life Topic Politics
Country Topic Life Country Topic Politics COVID
Country COVID Topic Life COVID Topic Politics COVID
To




= + + + +
+ * + * +
+ * + * + *
+ 6( ) ( )i i i i i ipic Life Country COVID Topic Politics Country COVIDγ* * + * *
 
(2)
where Topici is the category of topic in the sentences (reference category is Economy). The results 
are summarized in model 2 on Table 3, and the interaction plot is in Figure 4.
All three topics show a decrease in the sentiment score about China after the outbreak of 
COVID-19. Therefore, hypothesis 3 is rejected; even in the Chinese newspaper, China suffered from 




























Country x Topics (Life) 0.075***
(0.015)
Country x Topics (Politics) -0.098***
(0.012)
COVID x Topics (Life) -0.199***
(0.009)
COVID x Topics (Politics) -0.138***
(0.009)
Country x COVID x Topics (Life) -0.088***
(0.022)




Adjusted R2 0.068 0.172
Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.005
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the decline in the sentiment. On the other hand, while the sentiment about the U.S. in the articles 
about the economy does not decrease statistically, articles about politics and life show a decline in 
the sentiment about the United States. Therefore, hypothesis 4 seems supported by the result: the 
sentiments in the articles about life and politics decreased due to the outbreak of COVID-19.
Figure 3: Interaction plot of model (1): two-way interaction model (error bar is 95 percent confidence interval)
Figure 4: Interaction plot of model (2): three-way interaction model (error bar is 95 percent confidence interval)
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However, the result here does not support all the reasoning behind hypothesis 4; while the sen-
timent about the U.S. in life article decreased after the pandemic, it does not mean the negative 
campaign. In constructing hypothesis 4, the rationale is that the negative campaign against the 
United States occurred, especially about the life and the policy related to the pandemic. However, 
according to Figure 5, the sentiment about life is far above the sentiment about economy and poli-
tics. Aside from the dispute over COVID-19, both politics and economy have a unique source of 
rivalry, such as the trade war or Taiwan issue. Indeed, the sentiments of both two topics are much 
lower than the sentiment of life, even before the pandemic. Therefore, if a massive negative cam-
paign was conducted in life articles, it is expected that the sentiment score should be similar to that 
of either politics or life. However, Table 3 shows a different result: the sentiment score about life is 
still far above politics and economy. Therefore, hypothesis 4 is only partially accepted; the further 
inflation of the negative campaign occurred only in the political articles.
The change about life articles represents the two characteristics of the negative campaign, 
along with the Chinese Aggressive public diplomacy. Firstly, articles about life mainly include edu-
cation or culture. Thus, the U.S. appears in the context of cultural interaction or educational 
exchange, which could not be done due to COVID-19. Secondly, when discussing COVID-19 issues 
in the context of the negative campaign against the United States, the articles mostly include gov-
ernmental or administrative issues. In other words, Chinese aggressive public diplomacy is not 
likely to attack solely other citizens’ life. The negative campaign mostly aims to degenerate the 
other governments so as to elevate the legitimacy of the reign of the Chinese Communist Party. As 
a result, the decrease in the sentiment of life about the United States after COVID-19 mostly 
reflects the decline in the foreign cultural exchange or the educational opportunity in the United 
States; it does not reflect the negative campaign about the life of the United States.
Figure 5: Change of the sentiment against the United States
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7  Discussion
The implication of the results could be summarized into the following three points; first of all, 
the results demonstrate that even the Chinese newspapers struggled in telling China’s stories well 
after the outbreak of COVID-19. The hypotheses about China (hypothesis 1 and 3) are rejected, and 
the results rather show the opposite: even in the Chinese newspapers, the sentiment score about 
China declined after the pandemic. Although the sentiment score about China is much higher than 
that about the United States, the decline of the sentiment about China is more significant than that 
about the U.S.(see Figure 3). The decline mechanism is a result of the pandemic. Before the out-
break of COVID-19, the articles classified as Chinese ones mainly include praising the greatness of 
what the Chinese government achieved, such as the Belt and Road Initiative. After the pandemic, 
however, because it was evident that the Chinese government confronted the pandemic, the news 
articles started to include the ones highlighting the Chinese effort on the pandemic, whose senti-
ment is not as high as the sentiment of the articles on the achieved policies. Indeed, Jacob (2020) 
noted that after the pandemic, China launched massive efforts on deflecting the criticism concern-
ing the pandemic, such as highlighting the mitigation efforts. However, because the outbreak of 
COVID-19 itself could not be ignored, even though the Chinese efforts have been highlighted in the 
news articles, overall, the sentiment about China has declined after the pandemic.
Secondly, while the Chinese newspapers have negatively mentioned the United States, the con-
firmed negative campaign is limited, mostly in political articles. While hypothesis 2 (the hypothesis 
of the sentiment about the U.S.) is supported, it does not indicate the acceleration of the negative 
campaign; the partial rejection of hypothesis 4 indicates that the acceleration of the negative cam-
paign occurred only about the political articles. This is because the negative campaign was already 
conducted. Even before the outbreak of COVID-19, the Sino-US rivalry was intensified, and the neg-
ative campaign along with Aggressive public diplomacy had been employed. Both politics and 
economy had their reason for rivalries, such as the trade war or the Hong Kong issue. Therefore, 
compared with the sentiment about China, the change of the sentiment is smaller in all topics 
except life because Aggressive diplomacy existed all the time before the pandemic. In the life arti-
cles, the U.S. sentiment shows a significant decrease after the pandemic; however, as previously 
discussed, it is not rational to regard the change as Aggressive public diplomacy because the polar-
ity of the sentiment about life is much higher than that about politics and economy (Figure 2). 
Therefore, the decline in the sentiment about life is from not Aggressive public diplomacy but the 
cessation of the cultural or educational exchange. In conclusion, this study confirms that although 
the outbreak of COVID-19 might trigger a further negative campaign in the United States, its 
change might be limited and only statistically confirmed in political articles.
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Finally, while the decline in the U.S. sentiment about life does not indicate a further negative 
campaign, this decline might have a profound implication over public diplomacy and soft power. 
Hypothesis 4 is essentially rejected because the reasoning behind it is proven wrong. Hypothesis 4 
is about the escalation of the negative campaign in articles about politics and life, and the results on 
Figure 4 match hypothesis 4. However, the decline does not mean the escalation of the negative 
campaign; assuming the Figure 5, in terms of the sentiment, the economic or political articles are 
significantly lower than life articles. Therefore, if the negative campaign was conducted on life arti-
cles, the sentiment score should drop more and be similar to political or economic articles. The 
unexpected results are because of the characteristic of the Chinese negative campaign. When Chi-
nese newspapers denounced the other countries in terms of COVID-19, they mainly targeted the 
governments, not solely at the citizens; thus, the rebuke on other countries in terms of COVID-19 is 
classified in political articles. The drop of the U.S. sentiment in life articles occurred because the U.S. 
appears mainly in the context of the educational or cultural exchange in life articles. Therefore, the 
sentiment against the U.S. dropped after the COVID-19 because of the cessation of the cultural or 
educational activities. While these results fall beyond the scope of this study, however, it might 
have the profound implication over Chinese soft power. As discussed in the literature review, the 
recent Chinese effort on propaganda results from the acceptance of soft power and public diplo-
macy. Globalization accelerated the spread of information and culture, which expanded the role of 
image in international relations. This background generated attention to the notion of soft power; as 
an instrument to enhance the image, public diplomacy gained popularity. While Chinese diplomacy 
practice puts weight on the state’s role, the original concept of public diplomacy in the context of 
soft power differs (Shambaugh 2020). The father of soft power, Joseph Nye, emphasized the role of 
cultural exchange and mutual understanding at the civilian level (Nye 2008). Therefore, though this 
study focuses on state propaganda, the confirmed cessation of the cultural exchange might pro-
foundly affect soft power. As discussed already, the arguments related to life articles demonstrate 
that the drop of the sentiment about the U.S. in life articles reflects not the negative campaign but 
the stop of the cultural exchange. However, because the decline reflects the stop of cultural 
exchange or the educational exchange between the United States and China, it might lead to the 
reduction in the civilian amicability between the United States and China, which could have a more 
profound effect on soft power.
8  Conclusion
In conclusion, this study demonstrates that while the outbreak of COVID-19 invited a limited 
increase in the negative campaign against the United States, even Chinese newspapers struggled in 
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telling China’s story well. The outbreak of COVID-19 became a crucial moment in terms of Chinese 
public diplomacy. Since the 21st century, the Chinese government has mainly engaged in public 
diplomacy to tackle the China threat theory. The outbreak of COVID- 19 entangled the problem of 
Chinese reputation. The delay in reporting the virus resulted in a global pandemic, and it led to the 
deterioration of the Chinese reputation (Jacob 2020). Therefore, the Chinese Communist Party had 
to confront one of the biggest challenges to repair the image due to the pandemic. Thus, this study 
investigates the structural change in the story-telling in the English versions of the Chinese news 
outlets. Because the Chinese public diplomacy could be categorized into two types, either about 
themselves (Passive or Active public diplomacy) or the negative campaign (Aggressive public diplo-
macy), this study estimates the change of the sentiment about countries (the U.S. and China) after 
the pandemic. The statistical analysis elucidates the struggle in telling China’s stories well and the 
little change of negative campaign against the United States. The outbreak of the pandemic 
changed the Chinese media’s way of story-telling about China. The stories about China started to 
include not only the ones praising what the government achieved but also the ones highlighting the 
governmental efforts. On the other hand, the further inflation of negative campaign on the United 
States is observed only in the political articles because the negative campaign was already con-
ducted. Overall, while the pandemic is not the crucial structural break in terms of the negative 
campaign against the United States, COVID-19 has damaged China’s story-telling capacity.
The research of the U.S. public diplomacy and comparison between China and the United 
States might be enumerated as one direction of future research. This paper investigates only Chi-
nese public diplomacy. While the research on Chinese public diplomacy give an in-depth 
understanding and highlight any change in public diplomacy, it talks little about the international 
relationship between the United States and China. Given the recent work on the negative campaign, 
public diplomacy should be understood as a relation. Indeed, Kohama, Inamasu, and Tago (2017) 
demonstrated that the effect of a negative campaign depends on the tactics of the attacked. There-
fore, the results of this paper could not generalize about the China-US rivalry in general; and the 
comparative research between the Chinese public diplomacy and the American one is necessary, 
especially in terms of the negative campaign.
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